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I. Introduction 
  
 Trade unions and the workers who form them are vital partners in the effort to ensure strong, 
broad-based economic growth. Unions are vital for promoting social and economic empowerment, 
equitable economic growth, and the democratic reforms needed to ensure a fair and equitable trading 
partnership. However, Colombia remains one of the world’s most difficult environments for workers to 
establish and join unions. Union leaders are assassinated, attacked, or threatened at alarming rates. Leaders 
of paramilitary forces, who are accused of orchestrating the brutal murders of workers and labor leaders, 
enjoy broad impunity. Also, Colombian workers’ are being threatened by expanding forms of labor 
contracting in violation of the workers’ right to organize and bargain collectively. As a result, union density 
remains low in Colombia.  In 2008, barely 4 percent of workers were union members and only 1.2 percent 
of workers worked under an employer-employee negotiated collective bargaining agreement.1  
Rather than protecting the rights of workers, the Colombian Government has instead supported 
illegal paramilitary organizations and allowed them to enjoy impunity.  The Colombian Government has 
failed to make meaningful progress in ending the violence against union leaders.  Paramilitary organizations, 
like the AUC (or United Self Defense Forces of Colombia), many with ties high-level Colombian 
government officials and U.S. corporations, continue to hold significant political and economic power. Also, 
the Colombian Government has promoted the widespread use of labor contracting which denies hundreds 
of thousands of workers the right to freedom of association. In short, the Colombian government is 
fundamentally unprepared to enter into an FTA with the United States. 
 
 
                                                 
1 2009 International Trade Union Confederation Survey of violations of trade union rights found at http://survey09.ituc-
csi.org/survey.php?IDContinent=2&IDCountry=GTM&Lang=EN 
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II. The US Government must require the successful implementation of preconditions to ensure 
that Colombian workers can freely exercise their right to freedom of association. 
 
Before the US enters into a Free Trade Agreement with Colombia, the US Government must ensure 
that the Colombian government implements strict labor-related preconditions to address the underlying 
factors that have lead to serious violation of the right to freedom of association, including the murder of 
labor activists and the widespread impunity enjoyed by those responsible. (1) It must fully dismantle the 
paramilitary forces that commit labor homicides, (2) end impunity for all of those who responsible for labor 
murders and other threats to workers, and (3) ensure that courts can act in an independent and unbiased 
manner. Additionally, (4) the U.S. Department of Justice must work with the Colombian government to 
fully investigate and prosecute those responsible for the murder of trade union leaders, including U.S.-based 
multi-national corporations who are alleged to have aided in the many of the murders. Finally, (5) The 
Colombian government must also effectively enforce laws and policies that ban labor “cooperatives” and 
reduce, rather than promote, contractual forms of employment in Colombia, as recommended by the ILO. 
The Colombian Government’s commitment to reform cannot be adequately measured by any set of 
benchmarks built into the agreement.2 As Guatemala has demonstrated, when civilian authorities cannot 
effectively control the military, paramilitary or other armed groups, labor leaders will continue to be 
routinely attacked and killed with impunity. Despite the labor conditions negotiated into DR-CAFTA3, and 
the capacity building funds that accompanied the agreement, Guatemalan labor leaders continue to suffer.  
Only preconditions measured over a sustained period of time will provide adequate assurances that Colombia 
is serious about implementing needed reforms to protect labor organizers and ensure that all workers can 
form and join trade unions.  
 
(1) – (3). The Colombian government must bring an end the political and economic 
power enjoyed by paramilitary groups, prosecute those responsible for labor 
homicides, and ensure an independent, unbiased judiciary. 
 
(1) Paramilitary groups continue to kill labor leaders with impunity. 
 
The AUC, which was designated a terrorist organization by the Department of State on October 5, 
20014 under the Patriot Act, and other paramilitary organizations have been engaged in an all out war against 
trade unionists, often with the assistance of U.S.-based multinationals corporations or the Colombian 
government.5 New paramilitary groups responsible for labor homicides continue to emerge. As a result, 
nearly 500 unionists have been killed since 2002 when current President Alvaro Uribe was elected.6 In 2008 
                                                 
2 Benchmarks would only create temporary incentives for the Colombian Government to decrease union murders but would 
not address the Colombian Government’s political will to fully dismantle paramilitary forces, end impunity in order to 
guarantee all workers the right to freely associate. 
 
3 2009 International Trade Union Confederation Survey of violations of trade union rights found at http://survey09.ituc-
csi.org/survey.php?IDContinent=2&IDCountry=GTM&Lang=EN  
 
4 U.S. Department of State, Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism “2001 Report on Foreign Terrorist 
Organizations,” October 5, 2001 
 
5 For decades, illegal paramilitary groups such as the AUC have carried out a campaign of terror throughout Colombia 
against anyone it suspected of aiding or sympathizing with the FARC and ELN guerrillas. 
 
6 Between Uribe’s inauguration on August 7th 2002 and December 31st 2008, there were 482 documented cases of trade 
union murders in Colombia according to the Escuela Nacional Sindical’s (ENS) records. (The ENS is an independent non-
governmental organization in Colombia whose information is frequently cited by the U.S.government and used by the ILO.) 
See USLEAP “Colombia Fact Sheet,” found online at http://www.usleap.org/files/Impunity%20Fact%20Sheet.pdf. 
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alone, 49 union leaders were killed, which is a 25% increase in labor homicides from 2007. Already this year, 
27 unionists have been murdered.7 Death threats, arrests and other violations continue were 72% higher 
than in 2007.8 
 Yet, the Colombian Government has failed to make any meaningful effort disarm and prosecute the 
paramilitary leaders and others responsible for labor homicides. The Colombian Government has failed to 
effectively investigate and prosecute the 2,700 labor homicide cases that have occurred since 1986. The 
impunity rate remains at 96.7% and the Colombian Prosecutor General’s Subdivision on of Investigation 
only recognizes 40% of the union murder cases committed in the last 23 years.9 A very low percentage of 
the investigations reach courts and result in the conviction of those responsible.10  Also, the Prosecutor 
General’s office has not even created a work plan for investigating the enormous backlog of labor homicide 
cases, further undermining the Colombian Government’s credibility in dealing with pervasive impunity. 
 
 (2) Paramilitary groups operate with the tacit support of Colombian government officials. 
 
Recently, former Colombian government officials have been alleged to be working with paramilitary 
organizations. Over the last two years, members of both the Uribe Administration and the Colombian 
Congress have come under heavy scrutiny for having close ties with paramilitary forces responsible for labor 
homicides. In one of many examples, Jorge Noguera, Colombia’s former intelligence chief, was indicted in 
February of 2007 for helping violent right-wing paramilitaries to infiltrate high levels of the Colombian 
Government. Additionally, in September 2008, General Mario Montoya Uribe, the leader of Colombia’s 
army was accused of working closely with paramilitaries and funneling weapons to key paramilitary 
commanders.11 In the recent notorious “Parapolitics” scandal, the Colombian Supreme Court implicated a 
number of high-ranking government officials, including 60 congressional representatives aligned with Uribe 
in collaborating with paramilitaries and shielding paramilitaries from justice.12 
 
(3) Colombian judges face tremendous pressure to ensure continued impunity. 
 
Colombian courts also face significant pressure to ensure impunity for the intellectual authors of 
crimes against union leaders. For example, specially appointed labor Judge Jose Nirio Sanchez, who 
                                                 
7 Ibid   
 
8 According to the Escuela Nacional Sindical, a prominent Colombian organization dedicated to researching trade union 
issues, after 2003 there was a strategic change in the forms of violence against unionized workers, principally characterized 
by 1) the accelerated increase in detentions 2) the increase in violations of the human rights of women unionists 3) powerful 
restrictions to union freedoms, a significant increase in death threats, the increase in crimes committed by State actors 4) the 
use of a variety of strategies to disguise the magnitude of the violence.” See, “Cuaderno de Derechos Humanos No. 19, 2515 
Or that Sinister Ease to Forget: 21 Years of Systematic and Selective Assassinations (1986-2006).” 2007 p 54, 
http://www.ens.org.co/publicacion.htm?x=20152686  
 
9Escuela Nacional Sindical, “Examining Workers’ Rights and Violence against Labor Union Leaders in Colombia” February 
12, 2009, House Committee on Education and Labor Hearing. 
10 International Labor Organization, Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations, 
Individual Observation concerning Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise Convention (87), 
Colombia Published: 2009 pg. 2 
11 See USLEAP, “Colombia Fact Sheet,” March 2009, Human Rights Watch quoting Colombian Commission of Jurists 
(CCJ) records at Feb. 12, 2009 House hearing, See http://www.usleap.org/files/Impunity%20Fact%20Sheet.pdf.  
 
12 JUANA PEREZ 1-51/JUAN PEREZ 5E-50 v. DOLE FOOD COMPANY, INC. (Legal complaint against Dole Food 
Company). filed on April 28, 2009 by attorneys of  CONRAD & SCHERER, LLP. See 
http://www.iradvocates.org/4.27.09%20Dole%20Complaint%20FINAL.pdf  
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implicated the Nestle Corporation’s involvement in the murder of one of its labor leaders, was removed 
from his judicial post in a controversial, split decision by the Colombian Superior Court. Judge Sanchez’s 
removal suggests that judges who entertain controversial cases, risk their jobs.13 Unsurprisingly, the 
Colombian courts have failed to sentence the “intellectual authors” of union related murders, (with the 
exception of one) in other words, the entities/people that instigate, plan, order or finance labor related 
murders.14  
 
Before the US agrees to an FTA, (1) the Colombian Government must dismantle and prosecute the 
paramilitary forces and bring an end the political and economic power they enjoy today. (2) The 
Government must conduct a full, transparent investigation and prosecution of all government officials and 
companies suspected of having ties with paramilitary groups. (3) The Government must ensure that courts 
can act in an independent and unbiased manner.15  If not, violence against unionists will persist. Workers 
will continue to live in constant fear of death knowing that paramilitary forces are able to kill them with 
impunity. Workers will be unable to effectively seek better working conditions and the freedom to exercise 
their rights.      
(4) The U.S. Department of Justice must investigate U.S. Corporations suspected 
of complicity with labor homicides.  
Strong evidence demonstrates that U.S. corporations have financially supported illegal terrorist 
organizations, such as the AUC, which has directly led to the murder of dozens of labor leaders. 16 Public 
testimony given by demobilized AUC leaders like Salvatore Mancuso stating unequivocally that Dole and 
other banana companies made regular payments to the AUC in exchange for “security services.” 17 US-based 
multinationals Chiquita admitted to financially supporting the AUC, which lead to the killing of dozens of 
labor leaders. In the case implicating Alabama based Drummond Coal, while recent civil claims against 
Drummond were dismissed, strong evidence implicates Drummond in the financing of the murder of its 
union leaders. While the triggerman was recently sentenced, Drummond’s involvement remains 
uninvestigated despite recent evidence from Colombian witnesses that Drummond paid paramilitaries to 
perform the murders. To this day, these corporations continue to enjoy impunity for allegedly financing the 
labor homicides. 18 
                                                 
13 Ibid 
 
14 According to Judge Sanchez, “It is a systematic pattern that in all of these criminal acts [labor homicide cases], the Public 
Prosecutor is content to determine the responsibility of the material authors, leaving out the intellectual authors, who are the 
most important, given that they are the ones who sponsor, order the executions, put up the money, and always remain in 
impunity. Thus, these crimes will not stop, since the true perpetrators are not prosecuted.” See Statement by José Nirio 
Sánchez House Committee on Education and Labor “Examining Workers’ Rights and Violence against Labor Union Leaders 
in Colombia,” February 12, 2009 
 
15 On 22 June 2005 the Congress adopted the Law on Justice and Peace, which the government claimed was designed to 
promote reconciliation and the fight against impunity. In July 2006, the Constitutional Court of Colombia, the highest legal 
instance in the country, found that many aspects of the Law were in breach of the Constitution and amongst other violations, 
exclude investigation of many of the illegal paramilitary groups responsible for labor homicides. See: http://survey09.ituc-
csi.org/survey.php?IDContinent=2&IDCountry=COL&Lang=EN for more 
 
16  Supra, n. 12, available at http://www.iradvocates.org/ 
 
17 The testimony has implicated Dole in financially enabling the AUC from 1997 -2008 as a main contributor, along with Del 
Monte and Chiquita, despite warnings from the State Department. See www.iradvocates for complaints.  
 
18 See “Murdered Convicted of Killing Drummond Trade Union Leader, August 24, 2009, http://www.icem.org/en/78-ICEM-
InBrief/3361-Murderer-Convicted-of-Killing-Colombian-Drummond-Trade-Unionists 
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While Chiquita Brand International and its executives were able to escape any serious criminal 
liability for hiring an illegal terrorist organization which killed dozens of its workers by agreeing to pay a $25 
million fine, Dole Food Company has been enjoying full impunity for its role in similar murders.19 In total,  
20 more than 70 Colombians have filed a suit against Dole Foods with evidence showing that union activists 
or union members were systematically hunted down and killed by paramilitary units. Many of the Dole 
workers who were assassinated had unresolved labor disputes pending with their employers, were in the 
midst of collective bargaining negotiations with Dole, or were owed work related injury compensation. 
Evidence indicates that Dole had a financial interest in the murder of its unionists and may have paid 
paramilitaries to commit the homicides. Yet, Dole Foods and its executives have not yet been investigated 
by either the US Department of Justice or the Colombian Government.   
U.S. corporations will ultimately be major beneficiaries of a free trade agreement and should not be 
rewarded for aiding and abetting illegal violent acts performed by paramilitaries against union leaders. 
Therefore, as a precondition to ratification of a free trade agreement, the U.S. Department of Justice must 
work with its counterparts in Colombia and conduct a full investigation and prosecution of US-based 
companies who have aided or been complicit in the murder of labor organizers and leaders.  
 
(5) The Colombian Government antipathy for workers’ fundamental rights is 
further demonstrated by its denial of the right to freedom of association for 
contractual workers 
 
Colombian labor law and labor policy fail to meet internationally recognized standards on freedom 
of association as large portions of the Colombian workforce are denied the right to join or establish unions, 
according to the ILO.21  In particular, companies operating in Colombia, many that are owned or controlled 
by U.S. corporations, have profited from systematic abuse and overuse of subcontracted and short-term 
contract labor that has increasingly replaced permanent, direct forms of employment.22 “Cooperatives” and 
temporary work agencies are generally set up by employers seeking to evade regular employer obligations 
under the Labor Code by denying workers a direct and permanent employment relationship.  “Cooperative” 
associates cannot legally join or establish unions. 23 
Since 2002, when Uribe took office, 1,923 new “associative labor cooperatives” formed converting 
more than 350,000 positions into jobs that deny workers the right to freedom of association. As of February 
2008 Colombia sustained 12,068 registered labor cooperatives and in 2007, it was estimated that there were 
4,221,1081 cooperative members.24 Contractual work arrangements overall have also increased exponentially 
                                                 
19 Statement from Bob Perillo on May 6, 2009, contractor for the International Rights Advocates, re: legal complaint against 
Dole Food Company and Chiquita  
 
20 JUANA PEREZ 1-51/JUAN PEREZ 5E-50 v. DOLE FOOD COMPANY, INC. (Legal complaint against Dole Food 
Company). filed on April 28, 2009 by attorneys of  CONRAD & SCHERER, LLP. 
21 The Colombian labor code fails to grant workers’ the right to freely associate and collectively bargain in a host of other 
ways that have not been addressed in this document according the ILO and the ITUC. At the last ILO Convention, the ILO 
Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations have made 19 observations of Colombia’s 
incompliance with ILO Convention 87 on freedom of association. See International Labor Organization, Report of the 
Committee on the Application of Standards, ILC 98: Geneva, 2009, No. 16 (Part II) Pg. 23 
 
22 Additionally, many subcontracted workers are denied government and union social security and health benefits, the 
minimum wage and they are left in constant job insecurity.  
 
23  Labor “cooperatives” differ from worker owned cooperatives since they are not democratically run by workers 
themselves. “Cooperative” associates cannot legally join or establish unions. 
 
24 See Statement by José Luciano Sanin Vásquez, Director of the Escuela Nacional Sindical (“National Labor School”) of 
Colombia, House Committee on Education and Labor Hearing, “Examining Workers’ Rights and Violence against Labor 
Union Leaders in Colombia” February 12, 2009. According to the International Trade Union Confederation’s 2009 Annual 
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since 2002: over 500,000 workers are still denied the right to associate based on their status as contract or 
“cooperative” workers.25 Between 1992 and 2006 there was a 40% reduction in the number of permanent 
workers in the industrial sector while temporary contracts increased by 192% in the same period.26  
People don’t freely choose to join “cooperatives” or become “contract” workers. Rather, companies 
are requiring workers, many who are full-time employees, to agree to new contracting arrangements. Any 
full-time employees who leaves or is fired is replaced by contractual workers.27  
In export industries and those industries dominated by U.S.-based multinational corporations, 
companies have been increasingly forcing workers into labor subcontracting arrangements preventing them 
from exercising many of their rights at work. For example, at Coca-Cola bottling plants in Colombia 
workers have systematically been moved from direct employment to contractual employment, undermining 
their right to freedom of association. In June 2008, an ILO High Level Mission investigating labor rights 
violations at Coca-Cola bottling plants in Colombia found that Coke’s bottlers were outsourcing most of its 
labor through contracts, service providers, and temporary employment agencies and associated work 
cooperatives. 70-85% of the distribution and operating staff was outsourced. According to the report, “a 
significant number of the workers employed in these tasks had until fairly recently been direct employees of 
the company.”28 
Similarly, sugar-cane workers, who have difficult working conditions and are also required to bring 
their children to work29, are also required to work through labor “cooperatives” and are denied freedom to 
join a union. In the fall of 2008, over 10,000 sugar cane cutters resorted to a 56 day strike to protest sub-
minimum wages, lack of benefits, shifts of 12-16 hours a day in the sun and the fact that they are denied the 
right to union recognition which would establish formal labor relations with their employers.30 During the 
strike which was considered illegal by the Colombian government, workers were beaten by the State police 
and received threats from illegal paramilitary groups. Ultimately, workers were able to win better wages as a 
result of the strike, but are still denied a formal employment relationship, which would mandate that their 
employers engage with them in formal collective bargaining over working conditions, wages, and benefits.31 
Their children continue to face the likelihood of having to work alongside their parents to support their 
parents. 
                                                                                                                                                                         
survey of Trade Union Rights Violations, labor law and policy still exclude more than two thirds of workers from social and 
worker protection measures, by denying basic workers’ rights to over 12 million people.  
 
25 International Labor Organization, Report of the Committee on the Application of Standards, ILC 98: Geneva, 2009, No. 16 
(Part II) Pg. 23  
 
26 See Plataforma Colombiana de Derechos Humanos, Democracia y Desarollo,, Informe Alterno se la sociedad civil al 
Comite de Derechos Economicos y culturales, pg. 3.   
 
27 See Corporacion Cactus, “Cooperativas de Trabajo Asociado: Regulacion y Realidad,” 2007 
 
28 International Labor Organization, “Report: Evaluation Mission Coca-Cola Bottling Plants in Colombia (June-July 2008)” 
 
29 Sugar cane from Colombia is on the recent Department of Labor List of Goods Produced with Child or Forced Labor. See, 
http://www.dol.gov/ilab/programs/ocft/PDF/2009TVPRA.pdf 
 
30 Before taking action to improve wages, they once received a wage that was 45% lower than those hired directly by the 
sugarcane firms and face horrendous working conditions. See, Mario Pérez Rincón, Paula Álvarez Roa “Social and 
environmental debt from the sugarcane business in Colombia.” Corporate Social Responsibility and implicit subsidies in the 
sugarcane industry,” 2009 
 
31 Witness for Peace, “Los Corteros: The Plight of Colombian Sugarcane Cutters” found at 
http://www.witnessforpeace.org/article.php?id=587 
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The cut-flower industry has also become characterized by an increase in various types of contract 
arrangements including32 fixed term contracts, generally no more than 4 months, contracts based on 
production, for example based on the number of flowers cut , subcontracting through individuals or 
temporary employment agencies and subcontracting through labor “cooperatives,” undermining freedom of 
association throughout the industry. For example, just this past week the Benilda Plantations shut down its 
operations and laid off the remaining 500 permanent workers so that they could restart operations using 
only subcontracted labor.33 
Recently, the Colombian government has taken some measures to reform the labor code to regulate 
labor “cooperatives”. For example, in 2006, the Colombian government issued a legislative Decree in 2006 
purportedly barring employers’ from using cooperatives for acquiring their labor. 34 Additionally, cooperative 
members were granted additional social security and minimum wage protections under recently enacted 
laws.35 However, those measures fell short of granting workers the right to join or establish unions and are 
only window dressing to avoid having to address the ILO’s concerns.. 36 In fact, we have seen little evidence 
that the ban on labor cooperatives has been implemented. Because the Government has failed to make any 
meaningful reforms extending the freedom of association to contractual workers, including those belonging 
to labor “cooperatives”, the ILO said in its 2009 report, “The Committee requests the [Colombian] 
Government to take the necessary measures to guarantee explicitly that all workers, without distinction, 
including workers in cooperatives and those covered by other forms of contracts, irrespective of the 
existence of a labor relationship, enjoys the Guarantees afforded by the Convention [Convention 87 on the 
right to freedom of association.]”37 
 
To ensure that the benefits of trade will be broadly shared and ultimately lead to long-term 
sustainable economic development, workers must be empowered to organize union and bargain for good 
wages and working conditions, and enjoy the benefits of stable employment; not be forced into labor 
subcontracting arrangements. Therefore, before the US Government agrees to an FTA, the Colombian 
government must effectively enforce laws and policies that ban labor “cooperatives” and reduce, rather than 
promote, contractual forms of employment in Colombia, as recommended by the ILO. 
 
 
                                                 
32 According to the “2008 Report on the Colombian Flower Sector: Labor conditions and the crisis in the sector” by 
Colombian NGO Corporacion Cactus, 35% of workers at surveyed at plantations were employed through some type of 
contractual arrangement. ILRF has also received numerous reports that large numbers of cut-flower workers were replaced by 
subcontracted workers on many plantations. 
 
33 Untraflores (Union of Flower Workers in Colombia) Press Release,“Huelga en empresa floricultora Benilda,” September 9, 
2009 
34 On July 22, 2008 the Colombian Congress approved Act No.1233 which regulates the activities of “cooperatives,” See the 
ILO Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations, Individual Observation concerning 
Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise Convention (87), Colombia Published: 2009 
35 International Labor Organization, Report of the Committee on the Application of Standards, ILC 98: Geneva, 2009, No. 16 
(Part II) Pg. 23. 
 
36 See ILO, Report of the Committee on the Application of Standards, ILC 98: Geneva, 2009, No. 16 (Part II) Pg. 23 
37 International Labor Organization, Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations, 
Individual Observation concerning Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise Convention (87), 
Colombia Published: 2009 pg. 4 
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III. Conclusion 
Prior to entering into an FTA with Colombia, the US Government must require that the Colombian 
government achieve certain preconditions that will ensure that all workers can freely exercise their right to 
freedom of association.  
(1) The Colombian Government must fully dismantle the paramilitary forces that commit labor 
homicides; 
(2)  The Colombian Government must end impunity for all of those who responsible for labor 
murders and other threats to workers; 
(3)  The Colombian Government must ensure that courts can act in an independent and 
unbiased manner; 
(4)  The U.S. Government through the Department of Justice must work with the Colombian 
government to fully investigate and prosecute those who are responsible for the murder of 
trade union leaders, including U.S.-based multi-national corporations who are alleged to have 
aided in the many of the murders; and 
(5)  The Colombian Government must also effectively enforce laws and policies that ban labor 
“cooperatives” and reduce, rather than promote, contractual forms of employment in 
Colombia, as recommended by the ILO. 
 
 
